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Political Authority: Its Collectivist Structure and Juridical Ground
By Stefan Sciaraffa (McMaster University)
Many contemporary political philosophers distinguish between an institution’s
political authority and its political legitimacy. Per this distinction, an institution has political
authority only if its public is bound by a political obligation to follow the institution’s
directives, where this obligation entails that the institution’s directives are substantial moral
content-independent reasons for the members of its public. By contrast, an institution’s
political legitimacy is its moral liberty (1) to prescribe duties to its public and (2) to apply
sanctions and incentives to secure its public’s compliance with those prescriptions.1
Among those who accept the just described framework, there are two main camps.
The first queries the conditions in which an institution would enjoy political authority and
political legitimacy as described above. A second camp includes Joseph Raz and the many
theorists he has influenced. This camp pays little heed to the question of political legitimacy,
focusing their inquiries instead on the conditions in which an institution would have political
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For recent articulations of this distinction (allowing for some differences in terminology),

see Christopher Wellman (2001) “Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation”, Ethics
111: 735-59, 741 (see his fn. 8 for references to yet earlier articulations), Allen Buchanan
(2002) “Political Legitimacy and Democracy”, Ethics 112:689-719, 689-90; David Estlund
(2008) Democratic Authority, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 41, and; Michael Huemer
(2013) The Problem of Political Authority, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 69. Although his
terminology is particularly idiosyncratic, A. John Simmons also observes this same basic
distinction. See e.g., (2001) Justification and Legitimacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
137.
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authority. Moreover, this set of theorists insists on a slightly more complex account of
political authority. On this account, A possesses political authority over B only insofar as A’s
directives are both substantial moral content-independent reasons and exclusionary reasons
for B (i.e. second-order reasons for B not to act for at least some of her reasons).2 I refer to
these camps’ rival accounts of political authority as the simple view and the Razian account,
respectively.
Here, I argue against the simple view and the Razian account, and I argue for an
alternative collectivist conception of political authority. The paper’s core argument is
threefold. First, the Razian analysis of political authority rests on a key insight about the
distinctively preemptive normative force of authoritative directives. Second, a key failing of
the simple view is its failure to appreciate this insight. And third, the Razian account
mistakenly characterizes preemption and, hence, political authority as a relationship in which
the authority performs a deliberative function for individual subjects rather than for a
collective considered as a whole. Hence, the Razian account should be rejected in favor of a
conception of authority that construes preemption in this latter collectivist sense. This
argument proceeds in a number of steps.
In the paper’s first section, I explain the basis of the Razian account’s key insight
about the preemptive force of authoritative directives—namely, the pretheoretical datum
that Raz refers to as “the saying that in accepting authority we surrender our judgment to the
authority.” Moreover, I explain the connection between this insight and the subsequent
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For a brief defense of this exclusive focus, see John Tasioulas (2010) “The Legitimacy of

International Law”, in The Philosophy of International Law, edited by Samantha Besson and John
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Razian analysis of authority. I also argue that simple view theorists have good reason not to
incorporate the Razian account of preemption into their analysis.
In section two, I explicate the collectivist conception of preemption and authority.
That is, I explicate the idea that an authority plays a deliberative role for a collective as whole
rather than for individual persons. I then argue that a key failing of the simple view is its
failure to incorporate the collectivist analysis of preemption.
In section three, I employ the collectivist conception as a guide for refining and
improving upon extant functionalist accounts of the grounds of political authority. The
resulting Normal Functionalist Justification Thesis (NFJT) is the juridical ground mentioned
in this paper’s title.
The fourth section sets out my main argument against the Razian account of
authority. Stated briefly, I argue that that Razian account of authority leads to perverse
implications about the scope of institutions’ political authority and that these implications
are emblematic of a deeper failing. Namely, the Razian account specifies the limits of
authority in terms of considerations that would justify its playing a deliberative role for
individual members of a collective rather than for the collective as whole.
In the fifth and final section, I briefly discuss two issues in contemporary political
and legal theory that the collectivist conception of authority and its juridical ground promises
to reframe and clarify. As I argue, the collectivist conception reveals a non-parochial kernel
of truth at the heart of A. John Simmons’s storied particularity requirement, and it promises
to guide legal officials’ inquiries into the authoritative bases of their legal decisions.
Irrespective of the success of my argument, I hope to call attention to the fact that
heretofore few theorists other than Raz have offered sustained and careful analyses of the
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preemptive normative character of authoritative directives.3 Moreover, I hope to illustrate
that the analysis of preemption has far-reaching implications for further inquiry into the
political authority and political legitimacy of institutions and thereby to convince the reader
of the importance of assessing the comparative merit of alternatives to the Razian analysis of
authoritative preemption.

1. Two Conceptions of Political Authority
Put in terms of the philosophical vernacular that H.L.A. Hart invented, A has
political authority over B only insofar as A’s directives are content-independent reasons for
B.4 Per Hart’s design, this notion is a useful tool for describing one aspect of the distinctive
normative force that a political authority claims for its directives—namely, that the directives
are in their own right a reason for the subject to act as directed. More carefully stated, a
content-independent reason to phi is a reason of the following form: An agent intends for
the subject to phi.5 Thus, the notion of a content-independent reason enables the theorist to
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Stephen Perry’s (1987) “Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law”, 7 Oxford

Journal of Legal Studies: 215 could be construed as a defense and applications of an
alternative to Raz’s analysis of surrender of judgment. Also, David Enoch offers a friendly
reworking and refinement of Raz’s analysis of preemption under the name of quasiexclusionary reasons in his (2014) “Authority and Reason-Giving”, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 89: 296-332.
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See H.L.A. Hart (1982) Essays on Bentham, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 254-255.
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distinguish ordinary practical reasons that typically inform agents’ intentions about their own
or others’ actions from the content-independent reasons that such intentions supply in their own
right.
Most contemporary theorists of political authority (including proponents of the
simple view and those influenced by Raz) would agree that a political authority’s directives
are not merely content-independent reasons; they are substantial moral content-independent
reasons. Once again, we can look to Hart for further details about this widely acknowledged
aspect of the directives of political authority.
Hart holds that whereas a gunman’s demands oblige their addressees, laws purport to
obligate theirs.6 Accordingly, we can distinguish between obliging and obligating contentindependent reasons. A directive is an obliging content-independent reason insofar as the
basis of its content-independent force is the sanctioning or (I would add) incentive-giving
power of its source. By contrast, a directive is an obligating content-independent reason only insofar
as its grounds are considerations of substantial moral importance other than the threat of
sanction or the promise of rewards. Moreover, by dint of its substantial moral grounds, an
obligating content-independent reason is a weighty defeasible requirement,7 and, hence, it is
dispositive in a broad range of circumstances. As I understand it here, the contentindependent reason that figures in the simple view and the Razian account is a Hartian
obligating content-independent reason.
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See HLA Hart (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 80.
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1.1 The Razian Analysis of Authority
As noted in the introduction, the Razian account of political authority adds a further
element to the simple view, for it holds that in addition to constituting obligating contentindependent reasons, the directives of a political authority are exclusionary reasons for their
subjects.8 Raz’s argument relies on a methodological commitment that I (and other theorists,
e.g., Hart, as suggested above) share. Namely, Raz seeks to provide an account of authority
that reflects the understanding that animates the behavior of those who participate in
relations of political authority.9
In keeping with the just described methodological commitment, Raz’s account of
political authority rests on various pretheoretical observations of the behavior and attitudes
of those who participate in relations of authority. A key observation in this vein is that the
directives of political authorities are widely taken to provide reasons that qualitatively differ
from those that requests provide. However, as Raz further notes, requests are contentindependent reasons.10 Moreover, I would add that they are obligating content-independent
reasons. For example, as Stephen Darwall would agree, a person’s demand that I remove my
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also Leslie Green (1990), The Authority of the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 41-42.
9
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foot from atop hers would be in itself a weighty moral reason for me to remove my foot.11
In a similar vein, the requests or demands made by one’s counterparts in any number of
important relationships, such as friendships, marriages, filial relationships, and so on, are also
reasons of this kind. Thus, as Raz concludes, in addition to their obligating contentindependent force, authoritative directives must bear yet further normative features that
distinguish them from requests and demands of the sort just described.
Raz links the distinctive normative character of authoritative directives to “the saying
that in accepting authority we surrender our judgment to the authority.”12 Raz illustrates this
truth by way of the following example:
A man who orders someone else does not regard his order as merely another reason
to be added to the balance by which the addressee will determine what to do. He
intends the addressee to take his order as a reason on which to act regardless of
whatever other conflicting reasons exists….13
Raz’s claim is that whereas requests are generally regarded as content-independent reasons
that weigh in the balance against other reasons, the fact that an authority has issued a
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Ethics 120: 257-78, 262. For a discussion in which the affinities between Darwall’s idea of a
second-personal reason and the idea of a content-independent reason are particularly evident
see Darwall (2006) “The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will,” Ethics 116: 263-84,
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directive is generally regarded not only as a reason for acting as directed but also as a reason
reasons not to act for (i.e. to exclude) at least some of the reasons against conforming to the
directive.14
To put the just described distinction in terms that Raz coined, the feature that
distinguishes authoritative directives from other content-independent reasons (e.g., requests)
is that they are preemptive, which for Raz means that they are both content-independent
reasons and exclusionary reasons. As Razian theorists sometimes put it, authoritative
directives exclude and replace their subjects’ reasons.

1.2 The Razian Critique of the Simple View and a Rejoinder
We can distinguish two distinct but interrelated lines of criticism that Razian
theorists marshal against the simple view. 15 First, the Razian theorist criticizes the simple
view’s failure to note the exclusionary force of authoritative directives, and, hence, its failure
to reflect such directives’ distinctive preemptive character. Second, the Razian theorist argues
that the simple view’s inadequate characterization of the structure of relations of authority
impedes further inquiry into the grounds that might justify relations of political authority, for
the simple view theorist fails to appreciate that a political institution’s directives are
preemptive (and hence authoritative) only under very particular conditions. To wit, simple
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See Raz (1986), 41-42.
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See e.g., the criticisms of Buchanan’s account of institutional legitimacy in Tasioulas

(2010), 97-99. As is well-known, Raz’s famed Normal Justification Thesis is his account of
the normal way to establish that an authority’s directives are content-independent and
exclusionary reasons for a subject. See Raz (1986), 53.
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view theorists misguidedly consider many candidate grounds of political authority, such as
the duty of fair play, the natural duty to support just institutions, associative obligations,
consent, and a political institution’s capacity to coordinate its citizens’ important collective
efforts or its democratic pedigree, to name just a few, without assessing whether these
considerations would ground the exclusionary and, hence, the preemptive force of the state’s
directives.16
Although proponents of the simple view have surprisingly little to say explicitly in
response to the foregoing Razian line of criticism, they have a powerful rejoinder ready to
hand. To see this rejoinder, consider first the following two conditions characteristic of most
any contemporary political community. The first is that such a community is typically bound
together in part by institutions that prescribe and enforce frameworks of rights and duties
for the community’s members. The second is deep and widespread disagreement among the
community’s members about these rights and duties.
In such circumstances, whether the relevant political institution’s directives are
substantial moral content-independent reasons is a highly important question. Its answer
marks the difference between a situation in which the threat of sanction is the main reason
for an institution’s subjects to conform to the many directives that they find disagreeable and
one in which there are also substantial moral content-independent reasons to comply with
those directives despite objections to their merits. In short, the answer to this question
marks the difference between subjugation and at least the possibility of justified dutiful
obedience.
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The rejoinder to the Razian critique of the simple view is that although it would be
of great moment to learn whether or not an institution’s directives are obligating contentindependent reasons, the urgency of whether such directives are also exclusionary reasons
pales in comparison. Thus, the simple view rather than the Razian account of political
authority is the better frame for inquiry into the grounds of relations of political authority,
for it directs the theorist’s attention to the morally significant aspect of relations of political
authority.

2. The Collectivist Conception of Authority
The just described rejoinder generates a puzzle for the Razian account of political
authority. If, as this rejoinder claims, the exclusionary force of an authority’s directives is a
morally unimportant complement to its directives’ obligating content-independent force,
why do political institutions insist that their directives are preemptive and hence, per the
Razian analysis of preemption, both obligating content-independent reasons and
exclusionary reasons?
Many complex human practices are fraught with normative commitments that persist
only by dint of institutional or cultural inertia. Thus, the puzzle about the motivation of
preemption-claiming institutions does not amount to a decisive argument against the Razian
analysis of preemption. That said, this puzzle is an occasion to consider the alternative
analysis that does not saddle participants in authority relations with such undermotivated
normative commitments—namely, the collectivist conception that I now explicate.
From my own introspective and observational perch, I would put the pretheoretical
idea of preemption as follows: There are certain decisions about how I (and others as well)
must act that are for the relevant authority (e.g., perhaps a court, legislature, managerial
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committee, department head, or coach) rather than me (or those others) to make. In this
same vein, Stephen Darwall has recently endorsed Raz’s formulation of this pretheoretical
idea that holds that authorities remove certain decisions from their subjects.17
I rehearse the foregoing formulations of the surrender of judgment idea because they
are highly suggestive of Raz’s key insight about relations of authority. Namely, in such
relationships, there is a mutually acknowledged division of labor in which one party, the
authority, plays a deliberative role and the subject parties play the complementary executive
role.18
The collectivist conception of preemption and authority rests on the premise that
Raz’s insight is the foundation on which any adequate analysis of authority must rest;
however, it further holds that the subsequent Razian analysis of preemption and authority
conflates levels of analysis. That is, from the perspective of the collectivist conception, the
Razian account mistakenly holds that A has political authority over B only insofar as B has
reasons that require her to allow A to perform the deliberative role for her as an individual
(i.e., B must allow A’s directives to exclude and replace some of her reasons). Rather, per the
collectivist conception, A has political authority over B insofar as B and the other members
of the relevant group have reasons that require them to allow B to play a deliberative role for
that group as a whole.
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More pointedly, for the collectivist, it is a mistake to hold that allowing an institution
to perform a deliberative role for the group as a whole entails allowing it to play this role for
each member of the group individually. Accordingly, as the following collectivist account of
preemption and political authority illustrates, for an individual to accept that A’s directives
ought to be allowed to play a deliberative role for the group as a whole does not entail that
she must accept that A’s directives are exclusionary reasons for her or any other member of
the group.
The Collectivist Conception of Authority: A has authority over group G only if
there is a non-empty set of directives such that should A issue any of them, for each
member of G: (a) the directive would be an obligating content-independent reason to
act as directed, and (b) the obligating content-independent force of that directive
would both defeat without being defeated by the obligating content-independent force
of any countervailing directives that the members of group G might issue.
In keeping with the simple view and the Razian account of authority, element (a) of
the collectivist account holds that A has authority over a subject only if some of the
directives it might issue would be obligating content-independent reasons for that subject.
The core idea behind (b) is that a political authority characteristically has greater normative
standing than the members of its public. That is, an institution has political authority only if
the obligating content-independent force of at least some of its directives would defeat
without being defeated by the obligating content-independent force of the countervailing
directives that its public might issue.
To help clarify the collectivist conception of preemption, consider that one business
partner’s expressed wish that she and her fellow partners open up a Mexican restaurant
might be an obligating content-independent reason for each of her fellow partners that
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defeats without being reciprocally defeated by the obligating content-independent force of
her counterparts’ expressed wishes that the partnership should sell hamburgers instead. If so,
at least with respect to this one issue, the first partner would enjoy (collectivist) preeminent
normative standing within the partnership. Perhaps, she is the sole general partner and the
rest are limited partners. However, it could be that no partner’s expressed intention would
be sufficient to defeat the combined obligating content-independent force of the other
partners’ countervailing directives. In that case, although some partners might have greater
say than other partners (e.g., there might be classes of senior and junior partners), no
partner’s say would have preeminent normative standing within the group, and hence, no
single partner’s say would be preemptive in the collectivist sense.
In sum, (a) and (b) specify the collectivist account of the pretheoretical idea that an
authoritative institution removes certain decisions about how the group as a whole should
act. Note further that the idea of the scope of a political authority is implicit in this
specification, particularly its claim that the directives of a political authority are obligating
content-independent reasons. As noted above, an obligating content-independent reason is a
substantial moral content-independent reason that, as such, is dispositive in a wide range of
circumstances. The scope of a political authority is the set of circumstances in which its
directives are both authoritative and dispositive. Hence, the scope of any political authority is
partly a function of the force of the substantial moral grounds of its content-independent
reasons, for this force determines the range of circumstances in which an authoritative
directive is dispositive.
For example, it could be that although a legislature’s property-rule specifying
directives satisfy the collectivist conception, those directives would not be dispositive for,
say, the bank teller who a gunman has ordered to empty the bank’s safe. In that case, the
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bank teller’s substantial moral reason requiring her to act as directed by the legislature’s
property rules would likely be defeated by the gunman’s clear and present threat to her wellbeing. If so, the legislature’s authority would not encompass that set of circumstances.
However, it would still be authoritative, for by dint of their substantial moral weight, its
directives would be dispositive in a broad range of less dire circumstances.
To clarify further the collectivist conception of authority and its appeal, consider that
although (as discussed above) it is not clear why political institutions would insist that their
directives are preemptive in the Razian sense, it is easy to explain why they would insist on
collectivist preemption. Allen Buchanan puts his finger on the nub of this explanation.
I have said that for institutions to achieve the coordination needed to provide their
benefits, or at least to do so without unacceptable costs, they must have a certain
standing, at least in the eyes of sufficiently large numbers of people—people who are
in a position either to withhold cooperation or interfere with it.19
As noted above, within most any political community, there is pervasive disagreement about
the rights and duties of the community’s members. Hence, to sustain its capacity to secure its
public’s conformity to its specifications of these rights and duties, the institution must
provide its subjects with reasons to conform despite their inevitable objections to the merits
of its rights-and-duty specifying directives. Buchanan’s first key point in the passage above is
that generally, it is too costly for any institution to rely exclusively on sanctions and rewards
to keep its public in line. Thus (and this is Buchanan’s second point), to preserve its capacity
to coordinate, most any political institution must convince a significant subset of its public
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that it has a special standing that morally binds them to comply despite doubts about the
merits of the institution’s directives.
Buchanan nowhere clarifies his insight about political authorities’ normative
standing. That is, he does not explain what a public accepts when they accept that an
institution has such standing. The simple view identifies one key element—i.e. the
substantial moral content-independent force of political institutions’ directives, and the
collectivist conception reveals an indispensable further element. To see this further element,
consider first that in many contexts, an agent’s well-being would be profoundly affected by
the actions of others. In such contexts, the affected agent’s directives (e.g. its requests or
demands) are pro tanto obligating content-independent reasons for those others. For
example, as Darwall might put it, by dint of my dignity, my demand that you remove your
foot from atop mine is a pro tanto reason in itself that requires you to accede to my demand.
Now, consider further that in Darwall’s example, we are led to believe that only the
well-being and, hence, dignity of the person underfoot is at stake. However, in many
strategic contexts, the well-being of all parties is significantly affected by the actions of their
strategic counterparts. In such contexts, the expressed intentions of all parties about how
other members of the group ought to act are pro tanto obligating content-independent
reasons for one another by dint of the equal moral importance of the well-being of each.
Moreover, in such strategic contexts, there might very well be a cacophony of comparably
weighty and conflicting obligating content-independent directives.
The key point for present purposes is that in order for a political institution to
sustain its capacity to coordinate, it must do more than convince a sufficient portion of its
public that its directives are the pro tanto substantial moral content-independent reasons that
the simple view describes, for then its directives would be lost in a sea of comparably
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normatively forceful countervailing directives. Rather, to govern a group effectively, a
political institution must convince a significant portion of that group that its obligating
content-independent directives would defeat without being reciprocally defeated by the
obligating content-independent force of the countervailing directives that the other members
of the group might issue. That is, it must convince them that its directives are preemptive in
the collectivist sense.
In sum, the collectivist conception’s specification of the preemptive force of
authoritative directives is also a specification of the preeminent normative standing such
directives must have if they are to coordinate the members of most any contemporary
political community. Thus, construed in accordance with the collectivist conception rather
than the Razian account, the preemptive force of a political authority’s directives is not a
morally unimportant complement to their obligating content-independent force. On the
contrary, it is a highly important normative feature of authoritative directives—namely, their
distinctive preeminent normative standing. In this same vein, it should be noted that a
crucial defect of the simple view of political authority is its failure to reflect this highly
important feature.
.
3 The Juridical Ground of Collectivist Authority
The just described collectivist account of political authority invites a functionalist
account of the grounds of political authority—i.e. a defense based in the authority’s ability to
secure morally important forms of social coordination.20 In what follows, I explicate Kit
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Wellman’s sophisticated functionalist account, and I consider two key objections that A.
John Simmons has marshaled against it. As I argue, Simmons’s objections are occasions to
clarify the functionalist’s burden rather than decisive refutations of Wellman’s functionalism.
By contrast, I argue that that the collectivist conception brings a third objection to the fore
that calls for a significant amendment to rather than a restatement of Wellman’s defense. I
refer to the resulting functionalist ground as the Normal Functionalist Justification Thesis
(NFJT).

3.1 A Restatement of Wellman’s Functionalist Defense of Political Authority
Wellman observes that contemporary states perform the important task of rescuing
their publics from the perils of the state of nature. He argues that because and insofar as
issuing and enforcing its laws is the necessary means by which any such state effects this
rescue, it is justified in doing so.21 Thus, Wellman advances a functionalist argument in
support of states’ political legitimacy that rests on what he describes as a samaritan duty of
rescue. Wellman further argues that such samaritan duties of rescue are key elements of the
justification of the state’s political authority.
As I see it, Wellman’s samaritan-based defense of political authority rests on four
main premises. First, the state’s capacity to rescue its public can only be sustained by dint of

University Press, 246; David Copp (1999) “The Idea of a Legitimate State”, Philosophy and
Public Affairs 28: 3-45; Christopher Wellman (2001); David Lefkowtiz (2005) “A
Contractualist Defense of Democratic Authority”, Ratio Juris 18: 346-64; Annie Stilz (2011)
“Nations, States, and Territory”, Ethics 121: 572-601, and Enoch (2014) 20-22.
21

Wellman (2001), 747-50.

17

its public’s general conformity to its directives. Second, each member of any such public is
morally bound by a positive samaritan duty to contribute to the collective effort that realizes
this important benefit of rescue from the state of nature.22 Crucially, Wellman concedes that
rarely would any single citizen’s failure to obey the law undercut the state’s ability to effect
the rescue of its citizenry. Hence, he acknowledges that the samaritan duty of rescue alone
does not bind citizens to obey the laws of their state.23 For this reason, Wellman appeals to a
third premise which holds that the principle of fairness requires each citizen to contribute
her fair share to the collective effort that sustains the state’s ability to rescue its citizens from
the state of nature. In Wellman’s words:
By invoking fairness in this fashion, we may freely admit that no one would slip into
peril if a single individual disobeyed the law. Instead, we point out that it would be
unfair to shirk one’ s share of the samaritan chore. Securing political stability is a
communal responsibility that falls upon all of us; it is wrong to leave all the work to
others.24
Wellman’s fourth premise is that the fair contribution to this communal chore is conformity
to the state’s just laws. In sum, Wellman concludes that a samaritan duty of rescue
supplemented by a principle of fairness requires citizens to obey the state’s just laws.25
A. John Simmons marshals two formidable objections to Wellman’s argument. The
first is as follows:

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id. 749.

25

Id.
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It makes sense to speak of an individual owing a fair share of some task, in my view,
only if that individual is morally bound to some group or collective entity and its
enterprises. Others cannot demand of me that I do my part unless I actually have a
part in some scheme or enterprise to which I am bound.26
I take it that Simmons’s point is that persons might devote their finite resources to any of a
number of highly important collective efforts and that the communal project of rescuing
fellow citizens from the perils of the state of nature is just one of them. Hence, no one is
morally required to participate in this collective effort; rather, each is morally permitted to
devote their finite resources to this or some other effort of comparable moral importance. In
sum, Simmons denies Wellman’s claim that sustaining the state’s capacity is a morally
mandatory collective effort for the state’s citizens. That is, Simmons denies that the state’s citizens
are morally required to contribute to this communal chore.
Simmons’s second objection grants for the sake of argument that the communal
chore of rescuing one’s fellow citizens from the perils of the state of nature is morally
mandatory. However, it challenges Wellman’s further claim that fairness requires each citizen
to contribute to this effort by obeying the state’s directives.27 As Simmons puts this point in
one passage:
But the good my obedience is supposed to provide to others, remember, is the good
of security. And it is not at all clear that such a good could not be provided for
another by means other than legal obedience. Since the number of persons needing
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security is at worst three or four times greater than the number duty-bound to help
provide it, my fair share of helping to provide security could be done by providing
security for, say, myself and two or three others. (187)
A tempting rejoinder to Simmons’s objection is that should any community heed
Simmons’s suggestion and dissolve into small groups, each concerned solely with ensuring
the security of its members, it would thereby soon find itself in the perilous context of
strategic interaction that worried Hobbes. More pointedly, so the rejoinder goes, Simmons’s
objection illustrates the importance of public settlements—i.e. practices in which by and large
the members of a community (i) conform to the same set of norms and (ii) they are all aware
of (or are at least positioned to learn readily) the content of those norms and the fact that
their fellow community members generally conform to them. That is, Simmons’s objection
illustrates the point that Kant, Hobbes, Locke, and many other theorists have made. Namely,
to avoid the perils of the state of nature, persons who regularly interact with one another
must reliably observe a number of publicly settled frameworks of rights, powers, duties, and
so on.
For illustrative purposes, consider that two oft-discussed publicly settled frameworks
of rights are those that regulate the use of external objects (i.e. property rights) and those
that specify the conditions in which force may be used against the community’s members
(e.g., criminal law and procedure). The core functionalist idea is that unless frameworks of
rights of the sort just described are publicly settled, then different camps will follow and
apply distinct and potentially conflicting norms that guide them in the use of force and their
judgments about what belongs to whom. In such a context, the members of such a
community would find it difficult to predict either what resources they could use without
fearing the interventions of others or when others might use force against them.
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As a Hobbesian-minded theorist would emphasize, the just described
unpredictability and disagreement would lead to widespread diffidence of one another and,
hence, to pervasive physical insecurity, anxiety, and violence. Publicly settling these norms
undercuts this vicious Hobbesian logic, thereby holding the promise of significantly
advancing the security interests of all members of the community. Moreover, as a Kantianmind theorist would emphasize, such settlements also further fundamental agency interests,
for without the predictability and security they facilitate, the realization of many long-term
personal plans of paramount moral importance would be impossible. Moreover, the
enormous productive potential of cooperative endeavors that rely on such predictability and
security would remain untapped. 28
Tempting as it is, the foregoing rejoinder misses Simmons’s point, for Simmons’s
objection presupposes a context in which the state has by and large secured the public
settlements requisite for the realization of the fundamental security and agency interests
described above. Moreover, it presupposes, as Wellman concedes, that no single individual’s
violation will undercut the state’s capacity to rescue its citizens from the state of nature.29
Simmons’s challenge then is as follows: If no individual’s deviation from the state-secured
public settlement would undercut that settlement, then why does the principle of fairness
forbid the individual from discharging her obligation to contribute to the interests the public
settlement serves in some way other than strictly conforming to the settlement—say,
focusing on the security needs of three or four.
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Taken together, Simmons’s two objections reveal that the key axis of debate between
the functionalist statist and the philosophical anarchist is whether and to what extent the
subject of any extant political institution must contribute to morally mandatory collective
efforts by strictly conforming to the terms of public settlements secured and specified by a
political institution’s directives. To put the issue a bit more concisely, the key point of debate
is whether any institution satisfies the following Simple Functionalist Condition.
(SFC) The political institution’s issuance of directives has secured or would be likely
to secure the realization of a morally mandatory public settlement for a group in
accordance with those directives.
The functionalist argues that many extant political institutions satisfy (SFC), for at least some
of their directives (perhaps, those specifying the community’s property regime or regulating
the use of force) specify and secure the terms of a group’s morally mandatory public settlement—
i.e. a public settlement the terms of which the members of the group are morally required to
observe.
Viewed through the lens of (SFC), Wellman argues that although no one would slip
into peril if a single individual violated the terms of a state-specified public settlement that
rescued a community from the state of nature, it would be unfair for any citizen to violate
the terms of such a settlement. Wellman’s key claim is that maintaining such public
settlements is a communal moral chore that is equally incumbent on all members of a
political community. Hence, any citizen who might deviate from that settlement would
thereby unfairly and, hence, wrongly free ride on her fellow citizens’ settlement-maintaining
compliance.
A key point that Wellman and, a fortiori, Simmons seem to overlook is that the
principle of fairness is not the only consideration that might ground a weighty moral
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requirement to conform strictly to the public settlements that a political institution’s
directives secure. To wit, the fundamental agency and security interests that many public
settlements secure are also grounds of this sort, for in many cases, particular violations of a
public settlement would immediately and significantly set back these interests.
For example, I might use something that the regnant property settlement has
awarded to you. I might take a significant sum of money from you or occupy an apartment
that the settlement deems yours. In so doing, I would upset your long-term plans that relied
on the public settlement. I would also upset the plans of others that relied on your having
access to the money or the exclusive use of your property. Thus, I would significantly set
back your and others’ fundamental agency interests. I would also set back the security
interests of many, for now, the chances that force will be used to resolve this issue go up
tremendously. Moreover, if my actions are done openly, they are likely to provoke fears and
uncertainty in others about their physical security and the predictability of their social
environment.
No doubt, not all violations of public settlements would directly set back
fundamental agency and security interest. For example, the undetected tax cheat might not
directly set back anyone’s agency interests. And, I might not set these interests back by
surreptitiously using your apartment while you are away on a business trip or by ignoring the
proverbial stop sign inexplicably placed on a little travelled desert road. However, very many
deviations from such settlements would directly set back fundamental agency and security
interests in the ways described above Insofar as they would, persons are bound by a
defeasible moral requirement to conform strictly to the settlement’s terms.
Yet a fourth ground of a moral requirement to conform strictly to the terms of a
public settlement is suggested by a number of theorists’ broadly similar accounts of a key
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underlying value of democratic governance.30 Above, I endorsed the first premise of these
theorists’ account of this underlying value. This premise holds that with respect to terms of
social interaction that have significant and comparable implications for the well-being of
each member of a group, the say of each member of that group has equal normative
standing. Accordingly, so these theorists argue, the specification of such terms should not be
determined in a way that gives some members of the group greater say than others. On this
basis, these theorists conclude that a key underlying value of democratic decision-making
procedures is that they enable the group to specify the terms of such morally important
social interactions in a way that accords equal say to each. More pointedly, by violating the
democratically enacted terms, the relevant group’s members would thereby modify the terms
of social interactions in a way that does not give each an equal say.
In accordance with the foregoing account of the value of democratic governance, we
might argue as follows: By failing to conform to a democratic institution’s public settlement
of terms of social interaction that have significant and roughly comparable implications for
each member of the institution’s public, any member of that public who did not conform to
the terms of that settlement would thereby setback the underlying values of democratic
governance. Put in David Lefkowtiz’s terms, she would thereby wrong others by unilaterally
imposing on them her conclusions regarding what morality requires, thereby failing to
acknowledge the exercise of moral judgment by others and displaying moral immodesty and
incivility.31
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A crucial point to note is that all four grounds canvassed above are defeasible. That
is, the terms of a public settlement might be so morally egregious that it would be
permissible or required to violate them even though by doing so, one would set back the
values of democratic civility, fairness, agency, or security. That said, to the extent that these
values are not defeated and individual violations of the terms of a public settlement would
set them back, these values ground a morally mandatory public settlement. In other words,
the foregoing values (and perhaps others not canvassed here) are grounds of a defeasible
juridical duty to conform strictly to public settlements.
To be clear, my goal here is not to settle decisively the debate between the
functionalist apologist for political authority and the anarchist. Rather, it is to clarify the
terms of the debate and to emphasize that the functionalist has more resources than
Wellman or his anarchist interlocutors seems to recognize. In short, the functionalist’s
burden is to establish that some public settlements are to a significant extent morally
mandatory. And, the core functionalist intuition is that significantly setting back values of the
sort just described is a profound moral wrong, and hence, these values have the potential to
ground highly expansive though not unlimited claims to political authority.

3.2 The Collectivist Modification of Wellman’s Functionalism
The collectivist conception brings to the fore yet a third objection that calls for a
significant amendment to Wellman’s defense of political authority. To see this objection,
consider first that a number of critics have argued that functionalist defenses of authority
specify considerations that would justify acting as a political institution directs, but they do
not specify considerations that would justify acting as the institution directs for the reason

25

that it so directs.32 That is, these critics have argued that functionalist defenses fail to furnish
grounds of the content-independent force of authoritative directives. To illustrate by
reference to the SFC, this criticism holds that although an institution’s public would have
reason to conform to the institution’s directives that secure and specify the terms of a
morally mandatory public settlement, it would not be a content-independent reason. That is,
their reason to act as directed would be that they must do so to conform to the terms of a
morally mandatory settlement, but it would not be the fact that the institution has so
directed.
Although correct as far as it goes, the foregoing line of criticism does not identify the
key problem with extant functionalist defenses of political authority. To see why, consider
first that obligating content-independent reasons are commonplace. For example, legislative
enactments are issued by persons, legislators, whose well-being is significantly affected by
many of the enactments that they endorse. Thus, establishing the obligating contentindependent force an institution’s directives is not the difficult task. Rather, the difficult task
is to identify grounds of the preeminent obligating content-independent force of an
institution’s directives vis-à-vis countervailing directives. More carefully stated, then, the key
shortcoming of extant functionalist defenses of political authority, including (SFC), is that
they do not specify considerations that would, per the collectivist conception of authority,
ground the preeminent obligating content-independent force of authoritative directives.
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To meet this third objection, I add a second element to SFC. The resulting
functionalist account of the grounds of political authority holds as follows:
The Normal Functionalist Justification Thesis (The NFJT). The normal way to
establish that an institution has (collectivist) political authority over a public is to
show that:
(1) The political institution’s issuance of directives has secured or would be likely to
secure the realization of a morally mandatory public settlement for a group in
accordance with those directives, and;
(2) All things considered, the political institution’s issuance of those directives is
better than any alternative feasible modality for that group to realize that
settlement.
(1) needs no further explanation, for it just restates (SFC); however, (2) introduces the idea
of an all things considered better modality and the idea of a feasible alternative modality that
do.
Any number of factors might figure in the all things considered assessment of
modalities that (2) specifies. Here I enumerate three that are particularly important. The first
is an institution’s deliberative competence, which refers to the quality of the public
settlement (e.g., the justice or efficiency of the terms it specifies) that the institution is likely
to implement. A second is the democratic or representative quality of the decision-making
procedures that lead to the specification of the public settlement. To see yet a third measure,
consider that the members of certain ethnic groups might rarely occupy the highest
governmental offices in a given community, and hence, they might experience a sense of
alienation from the community’s governing institutions despite its high levels of deliberative
competence and democratic pedigree. All things being equal, the better modality of public
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settlement alienates the relevant public the least. In sum, whether one modality of securing a
group’s morally mandatory public settlements is better than another turns on the balance of
a wide variety of comparative considerations of the sort that I have just described.
An alternative modality is feasible for a group only if, given the relevant institutional,
political and sociological facts, that modality would be able to secure and specify the relevant
public settlements were it not for the interventions of the regnant modality. Although there
are difficult borderline cases, there are also clear examples of feasible alternatives. To name
one, in many instances, were it not for the intervention of the Supreme Court, the U.S.
Congress’s directives rather than the Court’s rulings would specify and secure certain aspects
of a public settlement for the American community. In such instances, the U.S. Congress is a
feasible alternative modality for the American community’s realization of the public
settlement.
By contrast, it might be that although democratic institutions would in principle be
the all things considered best modality for securing a community’s morally mandatory public
settlements, sociological and political realities (e.g. perhaps the community is riven by ethnic
and religious strife) might preclude the near term possibility of democratic governance for
that community. In that case, the democratic modality of securing public settlements would
not be feasible. Moreover, the regnant non-democratic modality would satisfy (2) so long as
its implementation of those settlements did not impede the emergence of the democratic
modality or any other better modality.
Note further that alternative modalities need not be institutional. For example, it
might be that were it not for the interventions of the legislature, certain public settlements
might be specified and secured by way of customary practice. However, for any number of
reasons, a community might be unable to sustain the relevant public settlement in this way,
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and in that case, this modality would not be a feasible alternative modality for securing that
settlement.
With the foregoing details in hand, I can now explain why an institution that satisfies
the NFJT would enjoy the preeminent normative standing specified by the collectivist
conception. The core idea is that if an institution is better than any feasible alternative
modality of specifying and securing its public’s realization of a morally mandatory public
settlement, then by conforming to that institution’s public-settlement specifying directives,
the members of its public would sustain the community’s capacity to secure its morally
mandatory public settlements by way of the best feasible modality. More pointedly, by failing
to conform, they would thereby immediately set back this ability. In sum, insofar as an
institution satisfies the NFJT, the obligating content-independent force of at least some of
the directives of such an institution would be preeminent, for the members of the relevant
public must follow its directives rather than the terms specified by any other person or
institution in order to sustain and avoid setting back their community’s capacity to realize
public settlements via the best feasible modality.

4. The Implausibility of the Razian Account of Authority
I argue in this section that the Razian conception of authority leads to perverse
implications about the scope of institutions’ political authority. The key point that I hope to
establish is that these perverse implications are emblematic of a deeper and fatal flaw of the
Razian analysis of authority. Namely, the Razian account mistakenly characterizes
preemption and political authority as a dyadic relationship between the authority and the
individual subject rather than an irreducibly collectivist relationship. Thus, the Razian
account misguidedly directs the theorist to considerations that would ground the
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individualistic form of relationship, and it defines the limits of political authority on the basis
of those considerations. To make this case, I discuss the Razian account of functionalist and
democratic bases of political authority.

4.1 Functionalist Considerations and the Justification of Razian Political Authority
In a number of passages, Raz states that the need to secure important forms of social
coordination is one of two key factors most relevant to the justification of political authority.
The other is the political authority’s expertise.33 Some of Raz’s earliest discussions of the
functionalist ground and expertise suggest that the former is a distinct and independent
ground of authority. To wit, Raz writes:
Authority can secure co-ordination only if the individuals concerned defer to its
judgment and do not act on the balance of reasons but on the authority’s
instructions. This guarantees that all will participate in one plan of action, that action
will be co-ordinated.34
In this passage, Raz seems to argue that an authority can secure the social coordination of its
subjects only if such subjects accept the exclusionary force of its directives. Hence, given the
importance of securing such coordination, the subjects of such an authority must accept the
exclusionary force of its directives. However, this functionalist defense of Razian authority is
deeply implausible. To see why, consider again a legislature’s public settlement of a
framework of rights, such as the regime of property rights discussed above.
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Public settlements of a community’s property rights are coordinated actions in Raz’s
sense, for they are realized only insofar as the members of the relevant public conform to
the very same set of norms, or, in Raz’s terms, one plan of action. Accordingly, the just
described functionalist argument for authority would fail if, contrary to Raz’s key premise,
communities could sustain such settlements even though few or none of its members
accepted the exclusionary force of the relevant institution’s directives. Because it is very
likely that many such public settlements have been maintained largely by dint of
considerations other than the perceived exclusionary force of an institution’s directives,
including fear of sanction and the belief that fairness or other moral considerations require
conformity, the functionalist defense set out in the passage above is highly dubious.
The foregoing criticism of Raz’s functionalist defense of authority is not meant to be
completely novel, for Leslie Green has advanced similar objections.35 Moreover, in response
to these objections, Raz has clarified his claims about the connection between a community’s
need to coordinate and the exclusionary force of the directives that secure such
coordination, now arguing that the need to secure coordination in tandem with other
considerations grounds (Razian) political authority. As he puts the point:
[I]f the person or organization is less likely to be biased than I am and if they have
greater expertise than I concerning the goods and social needs for which
coordination may be needed, and the ways of achieving them. In such a case I should
adopt a rule to follow the instructions of such a person or body, to regard them as
35
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authorities, within certain specified bounds.36
Thus, Raz argues that it is not the mere need to achieve important forms of social
coordination that grounds the exclusionary force of the state’s directives. Rather, it is the
imperative to coordinate at the appropriate time and the best way possible combined with
the relative deliberative superiority of the state with respect to such matters that grounds the
exclusionary force of states’ directives, and hence their (Razian) political authority. 37
To see the perverse implication of Raz’s hybrid functionalist and expertise-based
account of the grounds of political authority, consider Raz’s acknowledgment that authority
as he construes it is piecemeal, meaning that an authority’s directives might very well be
authoritative with respect to some but not all the subjects the authority purports to govern.
To use Raz’s illustrative example, laws regulating the use of certain drugs might be
exclusionary reasons for some of a state’s citizens by dint of the state’s superior deliberative
competence with respect to the reasons relevant to the proper usage of the regulated drugs.
However, the exclusionary force of such directives might not extend to all its citizens,
perhaps, those who are pharmacologists or doctors, for the pertinent deliberative
competence of these citizens might very well equal or exceed the state’s.38
Now, consider the legislature whose enactments publicly settle a community’s
framework of property rights. Moreover, for the sake of argument grant that the legislature
satisfies the NFJT. If so, then, as I have argued above, the legislature’s directives would have
36
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preeminent normative standing within the relevant political community, for all things
considered, it would be better than any feasible alternative modality for securing and
specifying a morally mandatory public settlement for the group (the group’s settled
framework of property rights). Nonetheless, per Raz’s amended argument, such a legislature
would not necessarily have political authority. On this account, to establish the legislature’s
authority over any subject, the theorist must further show that the legislature is less likely to
be biased than the subject or that it has greater expertise than the subject does concerning
the goods and social needs for which the public settlement of the community’s framework
of property rights is needed. Thus, it might be, per Raz’s amended argument, that the NJFTsatisfying legislature’s has authority over non-experts like you and me, but not say, Jeremy
Waldron or Richard Epstein.
The foregoing conclusion is deeply implausible. Moreover, it is an implausibility that
is emblematic of the fundamental flaw in Raz’s conception of authority. Namely, the Razian
account mistakenly characterizes authority as a relationship in which the authority’s
directives discharge the deliberative function for each individual subject rather than the
group as a whole. As a result, it misguidedly defines the limits of such authority in terms of
considerations that would justify the authority’s performance of a deliberative function for
an individual rather than for the group as whole.
In response to the foregoing criticism, a Razian theorist might note that expertise
and lesser bias are not the only grounds of the exclusionary force of an institution’s
directives. For example, David Enoch has recently refined and extended Raz’s claim that
avoiding anxiety and the expenditure of finite cognitive resources is an important basis of
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exclusionary reasons (more precisely, for Enoch, quasi-exclusionary reasons).39 However,
identifying such further grounds of exclusionary reasons only reinforces rather than
undercuts the key criticism of the Razian account, for the boundaries of authority that they
imply are no less perverse. To wit, the grounds that Enoch discusses would imply that the
authority of the NJFT-satisfying legislature discussed above would extend to those that have
reason not to devote cognitive resources to considering the merits of the community’s
property laws, but not, say, those that enjoy and perform a public service by doing so.

4.2 The Democratic Basis of Razian Authority
To see an instructive variant of this same criticism, consider that a number of
theorists working with the Razian framework have argued that the values underlying
democratic governance ground the exclusionary force and, hence, the authority of political
institutions. Daniel Viehoff recently has offered a sophisticated argument in support of this
claim based in the value that he describes as nonsubjection.40
For Viehoff, one person subjects others if she has greater power than her
counterparts to determine the terms of her social interactions with them, and she exercises
that power, thereby (as Lefkowitz would put it) imposing her moral judgment on others.
Viehoff adds:
Unless the disputants set aside the considerations of greater and lesser power that
they otherwise take into account in determining how best to advance justice or the
common good, they cannot hope to realize nonsubjection in their relationship. So
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the concern for nonsubjection explains the exclusionary demands of the directive.41
Thus, he argues that the value of nonsubjection requires more than refraining from acting in
ways that taking advantage of one’s great power. It further requires not acting for certain
reasons—namely, those that favor acting in ways that would take advantage of one’s greater
power.
For example, on Viehoff’s account, the value of nonsubjection would require the
citizen not only to conform to a democratically enacted term of social cooperation, say, the
requirement to pay a certain amount in taxes. Moreover, it would further require the citizen
to exclude from her consideration at least some of the reasons, perhaps the minor injustice
of paying the tax or the prudential benefits of not paying the tax, that favor exercising her
unilateral power to modify the terms of social interaction (i.e. her ability to cheat on her
taxes without getting caught).
I am not convinced by this argument, for I do not see why placing appropriate first
order weight on the value of nonsubjection and acting accordingly would not be enough to
pay full homage to that value. For example, I don’t see why the citizen who takes the minor
injustice of paying a certain tax into consideration when deliberating about whether to pay
the tax would thereby fail to heed the value of nonsubjection. To my mind, she would pay
full homage to this value if she rightly concluded that the value of nonsubjection requires her
to pay the tax despite its minor injustice and for that reason paid the tax.
To be clear, refuting Viehoff is not the primary objective of the foregoing discussion.
Rather, I voice doubts about his argument to illustrate the following point. Namely, from the
Razian perspective, whether Viehoff has identified grounds of political authority turns on
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whether he is right and I am wrong about the exclusionary force of the value of nonsubjection. However, it is implausible that the existence and scope of the authority of
democratic institutions hinges on the outcome of such an arcane dispute. Moreover, this
implausibility is emblematic of the deeper failing of the Razian account described above.
Namely, this account defines the scope of political authority in terms of considerations that
are relevant to whether the authority would be justified in performing a deliberative function
for an individual rather than a group as a whole.

5. The Promise of the Collectivist Conception of Authority
In this section, I recapitulate some of the key features of the collectivist account of
the structure and ground of authority that I have defended here. I do this both to clarify this
conception and to highlight its appeal and promise. In service of this latter objective, I also
briefly discuss two oft-discussed issues in legal and political philosophy that the collectivist
conception reframes.

5.1 Key Features of the Collectivist Conception
I have argued that the simple view of political authority problematically fails to
reflect the preemptive force of authoritative directives and the Razian account mistakenly
construes preemption in individualistic rather than collectivist terms. In this same vein, I
have argued that both the simple view and the Razian account fail to appreciate that political
authorities characteristically claim that that their directives have a preeminent normative
standing. As a result, neither account recognizes that the scope and limits of authority are
determined by considerations that would justify this standing.
I have further argued that The Normal Functionalist Justification Thesis specifies
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the conditions in which a political institution would possess the preeminent normative
standing distinctive of political authority. In summary, this thesis holds that if an institution
is all things considered better than any alternative feasible modality for specifying and
securing the terms of a group’s morally mandatory public settlement, then it has political
authority over that group.
Note that two distinct civic obligations are implicit in the NFJT: the juridical duty to
conform strictly to the terms of a morally mandatory public settlement, and the political
obligation to conform to the directives of an institution that secures and specifies the terms
of such a settlement. As discussed above, two distinct categories are relevant to the scope of
individuals’ juridical duties. The first category includes values, such as fairness, democratic
civility, agency, and security. Values within this first category morally bind individuals to
public settlements; hence, I refer to them as juridical values. The second category comprises
ideals of political morality, such as justice, that are the fundamental standards for assessing
the moral quality of public settlements (e.g., settled frameworks of property rights). I have
argued that the juridical values ground a defeasible moral requirement to conform strictly to
the terms of certain public settlements and that a settlement’s failure to realize certain highly
important ideals of political morality are potential defeaters of that duty. As discussed above,
a core functionalist intuition is that by dint of the weight of juridical values, such as
democratic civility, agency, security, and fairness, the juridical duty to conform to certain
public settlements might be dispositive even with respect to deeply flawed (e.g., significantly
but not egregiously unjust) terms of those settlements.
The scope of the second civic obligation, the duty to obey certain political
institutions’ directives is determined by the balance of the two categories of values just
described and yet a third category of values. As discussed above, this third category
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comprises values that are relevant to the assessment of the comparative quality of alternative
modalities for securing public settlements (e.g., democratic pedigree, deliberative
competence, and the degree to which its public identifies with it). In sum, I have argued that
an institution’s public is bound by a political obligation to obey that institution’s directives
(or, in other words, the institution has political authority over that public) insofar as (1) by
dint of juridical values, its directives specify and secure public settlements that are morally
mandatory for its public, (2) the juridical values are not defeated by ideals of political
morality that militate against compliance with those settlements, and (3) all things
considered, the institution is better than any alternative feasible modality of specifying and
securing the settlements.

5.2 The Collectivist Conception, Judicial Decision-Making, and the Particularity Requirement
As Raz has noted, a distinctive feature of the courts of any legal system is that they
are norm-applying rather than discretionary organs.42 That is, courts apply norms that they
take to be authoritative to decide cases and rely on their own independent deliberative lights
only when the authoritative norms are not dispositive. The collectivist suggests a novel and,
as I hope the reader will agree, perspicuous account of what it is for a norm to be an
authoritative basis of judicial decisions. Namely, in addition to providing the relevant judicial
officials with an obligating content-independent reason to decide cases in accordance with
the norm, the obligating content-independent force of such norms defeat without being
reciprocally defeated by the content-independent force of any countervailing norms.
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Moreover, to be an authoritative basis of a particular legal decision, the norm also must not
be defeated by any other countervailing considerations given the facts of the case at hand.
In this same vein, the NFJT is a promising guide for judicial inquiry into the identity
and content of the authoritative norms that courts must apply to decide cases. To see this
point, consider first that judicial officials confront a vast sea of candidate authoritative
norms, for there are myriad potential sources of such norms, including customary practices,
courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies at municipal, provincial, federal, international,
and transnational levels. Thus, courts face the task of determining which of these candidate
norms are authoritative. Moreover, they must consider whether to strike a balance between
competing sources of putatively authoritative norms, be it by way of a hierarchical ranking of
the sources, a division of domains of authority by subject matter or territorial jurisdiction, an
interpretive integration of the directives issued by the competing sources, or some
combination of these and perhaps other ways of striking a balance.43
A felicitous feature of the collectivist conception is that the NFJT, suitably modified,
provides guidance for courts in the just described tasks. That is, it instructs courts to decide
cases on the basis of norms that have been specified by the best feasible modality for
specifying the morally mandatory public settlements at issue. In this same spirit, it instructs
courts to rank and integrate potentially competing modalities of public settlements in the
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way that would constitute the best possible overarching modality of specifying and securing
the relevant communities morally mandatory public settlements.
A second noteworthy implication of the collectivist account pertains to the storied
particularity requirement. In the words of A. John Simmons, any defense of political
authority must:
be able to explain why the moral duty (or obligation) to obey is owed specially to one
particular society (or to its subjects or governors) above all others (namely, to “our
own” societies), rather than offering only some moral reason for obedience that
would bind one equally or more imperatively to obey or support the laws or political
institutions of other societies.44
On the basis of this requirement, Simmons rejects a number of accounts of the grounds of
political authority. For example, he argues that accounts that appeal to a natural duty to
support just institutions fail because they justify supporting any just institution rather than
one’s own political institutions in particular.45
A number of theorists are unmoved by the particularity requirement, arguing in
essence that it reflects an ahistorical and parochial prejudice about the nature of political
authority.46 I am sympathetic to this objection; however, I also feel the particularity
requirement’s intuitive appeal, as others must as well given the prominence of this line of
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argument. A felicitous feature of the collectivist conception is that it preserves the
particularity requirement’s kernel of non-parochial truth.
Like the particularity requirement, the collectivist conception holds that the members
of a political authority’s public have a special duty to obey that authority over and above
others. To wit, the collectivist conception holds that the members of an authority’s public
have greater reason to conform to the say of the authority than they have to conform to the
say of any other member of the public. Hewing yet more closely to Simmons’s particularity
requirement, the collectivist conception allows for the possibility that some political
authorities might be supreme within their domain of authority. That is, the directives of
some authorities might be obligating content-independent reasons for the members of their
public that would defeat without being defeated by the obligating content-independent
reasons that any other person or institution might issue, be they a member of the authority’s
public or not.
However, unlike Simmons’s formulation of the particularity requirement, the
collectivist conception is not unduly parochial, for it allows that the best all things
considered feasible modalities for securing and specifying morally mandatory settlements for
a public might include institutions that are not the public’s own. For example, the collectivist
conception allows that the tax laws of the United States could be supremely authoritative for
citizens of other countries across a wide range of circumstances (e.g., when those citizens
have significant business dealings in the U.S. or with companies located in the U.S.). Or, to
give a second example, the collectivist conception allows that directives issued by
international institutions, e.g., human rights law, could be supremely authoritative for U.S.
citizens and officials.
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In sum, in addition to illustrating the collectivist conception’s non-parochial focus,
the discussions of the particularity requirement and the authoritative bases of judicial
decisions illuminate two further important features. First, the collectivist conception is
modular. That is, it allows for the possibility that different political institutions might be
authoritative with respect to the same public or overlapping publics, where such authority
might be divided in various ways (e.g., hierarchically, by subject matter, or interpretative
integration). Second, the collectivist conception promises to guide legal officials in their
efforts to integrate and distribute authoritative labor among modalities of public settlement,
and similarly, it promises to assist theorists in determining whether and to what extent any
extant political institutions, such as legislatures, courts, administrative bodies, international
institutions, and so on are authoritative, be it singly or in combination with other modalities
of public settlements.

Conclusion
Here, I have defended the collectivist conception of the structure of political
authority and its juridical ground, the NFJT, and I have argued against the simple and the
Razian account of political authority. I hope these arguments are convincing, but even if not,
perhaps one important point would remain. Namely, the analysis of the distinctive
preemptive normative character of authoritative directives has far-reaching implications for
further inquiry into the authority of political institutions. Hence, developing and considering
alternatives to Raz’s analysis of preemption is an important and yet surprisingly neglected
task.
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